This is an English translation. Read the Icelandic original
💰Money & Economy

What would EU membership cost?

Direct membership fees would be higher than our current EEA contributions, but we'd receive substantial grants in return. The biggest gain is eliminating the enormous hidden cost of the króna. The public would enjoy lower interest rates and more competition.

When discussing the cost of EU membership, it's important to look at the full picture. We need to examine both the direct accounting impact (membership fees paid minus grants received) and the hidden economic cost of standing outside the Union.

What do we pay today, and what would be added?

Through the EEA Agreement, we already pay billions of krónur annually to Europe. We contribute to the EEA Grants (supporting development in less wealthy European countries) and we buy access to programmes like Horizon (research) and Erasmus (education). We pay without having any voting rights over how the funds are allocated.

As a full member state, our contributions would increase, calculated from gross national income (GNI) like all other member states. In recent years, gross EU membership fees have averaged about 0.8–0.9% of member states' GNI. In return, however, significant funds would flow back to Iceland:

  • Structural and regional funds: Grants for infrastructure and economic development in rural areas.
  • Agricultural support (direct savings for the treasury): The Icelandic state currently spends tens of billions of krónur annually on agricultural subsidies (farm product agreements). Upon accession, the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would take over a large share of this funding. In this sense, EU contributions would not be a pure addition to our regular budget — treasury savings would offset them.
  • Research and education: Continued (and expanded) access to the world's largest research funding programmes.

Because Iceland is a wealthy country (high national income per capita), it is nevertheless rather likely that we would pay more into the common funds than we receive back. We'd then be net contributors, like Denmark and Sweden. The outcome could, however, depend on the precise terms of the accession agreement, for instance regarding agriculture and regional policy.

What do the numbers say?

Calculations by Evrópustraumar, based on actual payments by Denmark, Finland, and Sweden during 2021–2024, suggest that Iceland's gross contribution would have been in the range of 19–25 billion ISK per year. In return, 11–17 billion would have flowed back in the form of contributions and grants. The net contribution would thus have been in the range of 6–8.5 billion ISK per year. For comparison, Iceland already pays approximately 7.5–8 billion ISK annually under the EEA Agreement and participation in framework programmes such as Horizon and Erasmus — without any voting rights over how those funds are allocated.

On 18 August 2026, the Foreign Ministry published an updated assessment of the cost of membership, the most thorough official estimate of the direct contributions to date. It assumes our net contribution would be around 0.2–0.3% of gross national income, or roughly 10–15 billion krónur per year at 2025 income levels. Part of what we already pay under the EEA is included in that calculation, so the ministry estimates the net contribution at about 8–13 billion krónur per year. That is in the same ballpark as the Evrópustraumar figures, though somewhat higher, and draws among other things on a comparison with Finland — a sparsely populated country that paid on average 0.21% of its national income over 2015–2024.

The hidden cost of the króna

But direct membership fees only tell half the story. The biggest benefit of membership — and the biggest cost of staying outside the EU today — lies in maintaining an independent currency in a micro-market. We pay a high price for the króna every year:

  • Interest costs for the public: Because of the króna, Icelandic households and businesses pay many times higher interest rates on their loans than our neighbours in Europe.
  • The treasury's own interest bill: The treasury's interest expense comes to close to ISK 150 billion this year — around 100 billion net of interest income — on debt of almost 2,300 billion. Non-indexed ISK government bonds currently yield around 7–8%, while the treasury sold five-year euro bonds at a 3.4% yield in May 2026. The gap of roughly four percentage points at comparable maturities is pure króna cost: same borrower, same credit rating, different currency. Each percentage point of that gap equals over ISK 20 billion a year. At euro rates, the treasury's interest bill could therefore fall by tens of billions annually.
  • Expensive foreign reserves: To defend the króna against collapse, the Central Bank must maintain an enormous foreign currency reserve, currently worth close to 1,000 billion krónur. The Bank holds this foreign currency at low interest rates (abroad) but owes Icelandic krónur at high interest rates (domestically). This interest rate differential causes significant accounting losses for the Bank every year, which must sooner or later be balanced out. With euro adoption, this massive reserve and its associated costs would become unnecessary.
  • Central Bank operating costs: The cost of running a full-scale central bank managing monetary policy for 380,000 people is proportionally high. With euro adoption, operations would become much simpler and cheaper, as the European Central Bank would take over monetary policy oversight.
  • Oligopoly and tariffs: We pay an indirect cost through higher prices on goods, due to tariffs and limited competition in a small, closed market — which the customs union and the euro would dismantle.

In short:

Direct membership fees would increase compared to current EEA contributions. But that additional cost would in all likelihood pale quickly in comparison with the enormous savings that the state, businesses, and households would enjoy from eliminating the cost of the foreign currency reserve, tariffs, and the sky-high interest rates of the Icelandic króna.


Sources and further reading: